Funding for Frontline is provided by this station and other public television stations nationwide and by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
During the Iran-Contra hearings, one of the most sensitive issues raised was Israel's role in the covert arms network.
Well, Israel was already involved.
Wherever you look today in Central America, you find Israeli weapons or weapons that were sold by Israel.
You can also find Israeli military advisors.
There are no official Israeli military advisors in Central America at all.
Frontline investigates the history of our strategic alliance.
Tonight, Israel, the covert connection.
From the network of public television stations, a presentation of KCTS Seattle, WNET New York, WPBT Miami, WTVS Detroit, and WGBH Boston, this is Frontline with Judy Woodroof.
Good evening.
The trial of Oliver North revealed once again the tangled, sensitive, and often secret relationship between the United States and Israel.
In the trial, U.S. government documents revealed Israel secretly provided weapons to the Contras at the request of CIA Director Casey.
Tonight on Frontline, we go to Israel to examine the long history of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Alliance.
It's a history which is told by Israelis who speak frankly about the secret role their country has played in Central America, Africa, and the Middle East.
Our report is called Israel, the Covert Connection, produced by Leslie and Andrew Coburn and reported by Leslie Coburn.
We had an idea, and it was called Israel, Strategic Ally.
It was a simple idea, and yet a big one.
We believe that Israel was not just the object of our sympathy and our goodwill, but a full-fledged partner with the United States, a partner fully capable of contributing to our security.
Israel's reaction to the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories is eroding popular support for Israel in the United States.
According to recent national polls, half of all Americans now consider Israel to be, quote, an unreliable ally.
That is not the view from the White House.
Some people still have trouble saying the words Israel, strategic ally.
I don't. Israel, strategic ally.
And it's got a nice ring to it, the ring of hard, enduring reality.
You will demonstrate how you load a shell.
Twenty miles from the Palestinian uprising, the Israeli Army treats American defense contractors to a display of military hardware.
And the soldier will be able to drink water.
All he has to do is take that out, pick it up, and he can drink water.
The U.S. puts over $2 billion a year into Israeli defense, out of $3.5 billion in total aid.
But the Israelis maintain they contribute a great deal in return for that money.
What can Israel do for the U.S. that the U.S. can't do on its own?
The United States is interested in the stability and peace in the Middle East.
And Israel could be very helpful in achieving this goal, if we will work together.
And we are working together.
It was one of the reasons for wanting to have Israel involved so that we could say it was Israel that was selling,
and Israel, everyone knows, sells arms.
Well, Israel was already involved, and we were going to continue to pursue it in such a way as part of the plausible deniability.
And part of the plausible deniability.
Israel's role was one of the most sensitive issues raised in the Iran-Contra hearings, a point well understood by Oliver North.
He and his superiors wanted to sell arms to Iran, but did not dare do it openly.
In order to keep the operation secret, they turned to Israel as a cutout.
They used weapons borrowed from Israeli stocks and delivered them to Iran on Israeli aircraft.
Money from the sales was passed through the hands of Israeli arms dealers.
Next question, Mr. Lyman.
Senior officials of the Israeli government were involved throughout.
When the arms deals were first exposed, the White House suggested that it had been a purely Israeli operation.
Was the point of view expressed to you that we have to keep Israel involved in this so that it can be blamed on them if it's exposed?
I don't want to use the word blame.
I don't think I ever used it, but very clearly, because this was a covert operation,
we did not want the U.S. government's hand or role in this activity exposed.
When the administration needs help, needs something done discreetly, it can turn to Israel.
We have some rules in all these issues, and we regard ourselves as allies and friends of the United States.
If indeed the United States wants something from Israel, we are very willing to help the United States.
Israel has been playing a very vital role.
So Israel isn't just a client, it's a partner all over the world.
Israeli Professor Benjamin Beit Halami has spent years researching the U.S.-Israeli covert alliance.
He is a critic who has found much ammunition for his case in the Iran-Contra affair.
We can take as an example the Contra connection.
We know that Israel has helped the Contras.
We can take other situations in Central America where Israel has been instrumental in supporting regimes,
especially military regimes, that the U.S. was very concerned about.
The alliance is based on Israel having proven itself to be a very useful ally in a variety of overt and covert operations around the world.
It's not a matter of sentimentality.
We decided to evaluate and discuss and analyze political events happening in different parts of the world,
whether it be in Africa, whether it be in Latin America, Middle East, or Asia.
And it was this sort of dialogue that we had together.
From 1980 to 1986, former Mossad official David Kempke served as Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry.
He is now Israel's official ambassador-at-large.
He was the key link to the Reagan White House.
From every point of view, the United States saw in Israel a partner,
to share its opinions, its views, and to even, although this may sound presumptuous, but even to get help in one or two things.
What would you say that Israel is doing for the United States in the Third World or around the world in terms of military assistance?
I think almost everything. Supply arms, supply military expertise, training, organizing and operating intelligence services.
General Matti Pallad has been one of the few members of Israel's parliament to question his country's contribution to the alliance.
Doesn't that cast Israel in the role of a proxy or surrogate?
It does, and I think that Israeli governments are very happy to fulfill that role.
We see cooperation, not only very strong cooperation here in the Middle East, but cooperation in Africa, cooperation in Central America.
For instance, yes, in Africa or in Central America or Latin America, the cooperation is directed towards the assistance given to underdeveloped countries.
Israel has a long experience in this field, and if they have a certain assistance of the United States or cooperation, we can do it together in a very efficient way.
We have a good technical cooperation with certain countries in agricultural things, mainly in agricultural things.
This has been very much encouraged by the United States, things like how to grow crops more efficiently and in a better way.
Our experts sometimes are quite happy to go in completely out of the way places where you don't find many other non-Latin American people.
And they do a very good work, if I may say so. Now, that has happened in countries like Salvador, and that's been our only presence in Salvador,
contrary to what some people have said about all sorts of military...
Military advisors.
Yes, there haven't been any, but we have had some agricultural advisors, that's true.
I would say that's our main help in Central America.
Wherever you look today in Central America, you find Israeli weapons or weapons that were sold by Israel.
You find the Galil rifle. You find the Aravah transport plane. You can also find Israeli military advisors.
We know that several leading officers in the Salvadoran army got their training in Israel, and they're quite proud of that.
Over the course of the civil war in El Salvador, Israel has been the second most important source of military supplies for the government side after the U.S.
When human rights violations cost El Salvador its American military aid for a period after 1977, the Israelis were on hand to fill the breach,
selling everything from Uzi machine guns to napalm.
All over Latin America, the military class admires Israel and sees Israel as its best model.
They see the Israelis as more like themselves than the Americans, and they see the Israelis as more ruthless and more efficient in whatever they do compared to the Americans.
But Israeli officials insist they set standards for customers of Israeli arms.
We do have limitations, and there are definitely conditions and cases where we have not sold.
Give me an example.
I'll give you an example. If we are asked, for example, for arms used for internal, in order to use it internally against, say, a population that does not lack its own regime,
for example, whether it be anti-riots or tear gas or whatever, we haven't sold it.
But in Guatemala, across the border from El Salvador, Israel has been heavily involved in the business of internal security.
Over the past decade, while U.S.-Guatemalan relations have been strained by flagrant human rights abuses, Israel has remained a steady friend without protest from the U.S.
What Israel has supplied the Guatemalan military has been a computerized system of tracking people.
In other words, you can have a computer system which has in it every man, woman, and child in Guatemala, and you can issue identity cards, and then you can follow people around.
You can find out where they are, who they are.
And whenever they are stopped at the roadblock, you can track them immediately, and then you can arrest them.
They may disappear. They may never be seen alive again, thanks to this computerized system.
Good afternoon.
We have a list.
If they're on the list, they die.
Since 1977, Israel has provided not only the computer network, but has been the main supplier of weapons and trainers for the Guatemalan security forces.
According to human rights groups, the Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaign has left at least 50,000 people dead.
One Guatemalan politician said, quote, the Israelis do not let this human rights thing get in the way of business. You pay, they deliver, no questions asked.
Let's take a country which is known for its human rights, a country like Sweden, say.
Sweden sells arms to countries that need arms.
Now, you have the wonderfully, beautifully so-called progressive countries don't usually buy arms to the extent that the others do.
And therefore, when someone sells arms to countries whose regimes one doesn't necessarily like very much, I can assure you Israel would prefer selling tomatoes to hand grenades, if we could.
In order to have an arms industry, you have to sell arms, and that's it.
You yourself have raised questions about cooperation with certain regimes in Central America or dictators in Africa in the Knesset.
What reaction did you get?
The reaction was usually that the government maintained its position that these matters would not be discussed in public, and that's it.
When the contra business first got started by the CIA in 1980, 1981, the United States turned to Israel because Israel could offer expertise and weapons and do it without any hesitations and without any political problems.
When the administration is blocked from offering direct aid by political pressure or by an act of Congress, Israel can step in very easily.
Did you have any discussion about the possibility of, in effect, farming out the whole country's support operation to another country, which would not only provide the funding but give it some direction?
There was some consideration of that.
And whose idea was that?
Well, I believe it was probably mine.
Can we call that country one?
Yes, that's correct.
Country one was Israel.
Former National Security Advisor Robert McFarland told Congress that Israel had declined to take over the entire contra operation.
But early on in the contra war, say White House documents, McFarland had arranged with his Israeli counterpart David Kempke for the contras to receive arms and training from Israel.
Oliver North acknowledged this assistance in a memo to his superior, Admiral Poindexter, in September 1986, quote, Israeli arms.
On Friday night, Defense Minister Rabin offered a significant quantity of captured Soviet block arms for use by the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance.
These arms will be picked up by a foreign flag vessel this week and delivered to the Nicaraguan Resistance.
If Perez raises the issue, it would be helpful if the president thanked him, end quote.
The contra's military commander, Enrique Bermudez, made no secret of the help he had received from Israel.
We received some weapons, the weapons that the Israeli government took from the PLO in Lebanon.
I can assure you that we have not had an ongoing supply of weapons and we have not had military trainers in those Central American countries that you're talking about.
I know that this has been said repeatedly that we've had them in the Nicaraguan business and in Salvador.
This just happens to be not true.
Are you saying that there are no Israeli military advisors in Central America at all?
I'm saying that there are no official Israeli military advisors in Central America at all, yes.
How about unofficial?
Absolutely not.
But we found some at home in Israel.
This is one of Israel's top military advisors.
At a firing range north of Tel Aviv, Lieutenant Colonel Amatya Shewali talked to us about what he does and where he does it.
What's this?
I'm just checking the pistol.
He has done several tours training security forces in Central America.
This is a Beretta 22 and this is a Uzi.
He chose his words carefully.
What about in a place like Central America?
What do you find about their abilities when you try and train these people?
First, what I found, it's a very good motivation and a willingness to learn.
They are very open.
And if people got motivation, you can give them everything.
Take the magazine.
Okay.
Now charge.
Quick.
Very good.
Now aim to the target.
Very, very easy.
Squeeze.
Very good.
You hit.
Is it difficult for someone like you to adapt from, I mean, the Israeli environment is very different from the jungles in Central America?
No.
If you've got the flexibility, the system, the principle of war, it's never changed.
You have to be flexible.
Yes.
You have to be able to move from here to a very different environment.
Yes.
But do you find that when you go and see people, for example, in the Guatemala, when you go see people in the Guatemalan army, do they look up to the Israelis as being very experienced people and these kinds of things?
Yes.
Pull, pull, pull, pull.
The reason is they take the Israelis, the Israelis get more experience.
Now.
Fantastic.
Okay.
In a situation like Guatemala, did they invite you to come or did you go there and say, I'm here, I want to train you?
No, I'm, I know, I'm, I'm known in Israel and the people that are in their connection in Guatemala or in Israel, if they're looking for someone in a job like this, they come to me.
There are some people who serve an important role as go-betweens.
They develop close relations with some military people.
They bribe people and they're able to get things done on the ground.
So these people, as a result, make money on commissions.
And there are several Israelis that have done that in Central America.
The best known is Pesach Ben Oor.
From 1977 on, Pesach Ben Oor was the arms dealer of choice for the Guatemalan military.
After 1983, he reportedly became a key operative in the Israeli arms pipeline to the Contras.
Have you ever run into someone called Pesach Ben Oor?
Yes.
Because I know that he works in that region.
I was in Guatemala, I was working for Pesach Ben Oor.
So he knew about you, your reputation.
He knew about me, yes.
And he said, this is the man we need for the Guatemalan.
Yes.
Look, we are a free country, we're a democratic country.
If somebody leaves the army and becomes a private citizen and what he knows is military stuff,
and he is contacted or he contacts some guy outside and goes and works for that guy,
providing he's not selling military secrets, Israeli military secrets,
we've got no possibility whatsoever to prevent him.
We don't like it and we've tried to prevent it, but we have no legal way to prevent a Mr. X
from going to, say, Guatemala, for example,
and saying I will work as the bodyguard of Senor so-and-so or whatever.
There's no way of stopping it.
So when someone is there working for Pesach Ben Oor, for example, in Guatemala,
it has no official connection with the Israeli government?
Absolutely not.
So why was Pesach Ben Oor in a position to ask you to come to train?
Had the Guatemalans asked him for people?
They said we need people to show us?
No.
Pesach Ben Oor, he's an agent of the Israeli army, of TASS, which is an Israeli industry.
And if you want a good connection in the government, in the army,
sometimes they pay for my training, sometimes you give them the gift.
It means to give the Minister of Defense.
That's a walk.
It's walking all the world, the Japanese doing it, the Americans doing it.
It means to give a gift in South America that if you want to go on, you have to give a gift all the way.
I see.
It's throwing a gift like this if you want to go.
If you don't give a gift, you stop.
So you are a gift?
I'm a gift sometimes.
While still on active duty with Israel's elite border guards,
Lieutenant Colonel Shuali says he trained nearly all of the officers above the rank of captain in the Guatemalan army.
All of our instructors have this operational experience.
Shuali works with Dror Ayyal and Yair Klein, marketing and managing directors of the Spearhead Corporation,
licensed by Israel's Ministry of Defense.
We always prefer to work for governments or for official organizations.
In some cases, we would work for private or semi-private, semi-governmental organizations,
but in that case, of course, it will be under the complete approval and authorization of our Ministry of Defense.
Spearhead is advertised by the Israeli Ministry of Defense as specialists in anti-terror and military know-how.
They offered to give us a demonstration of their professional skills.
The Americans have the problem of public opinion, international image.
We don't have this problem.
Our political views are very much parallel to the American political views.
We are fighting terrorism, especially in that part of the world.
We'll be glad if the American authorities will turn to us and ask us to do the job.
You mentioned the contrast.
I think here it's the same thing.
The Americans won't interfere directly.
We are willing to do it.
Do you just assume that the American government will approve of what you're doing, or do you have to ask permission?
We are positive that what we're doing is within the interests of the Americans, and so far it was always like that.
You'd have heard about it if it wasn't.
Of course.
How's business?
How are you doing?
We're doing well.
Do we look okay?
Along with the supply of seasoned advisors and a reliable source of arms, Israel can offer another important service.
When regimes in Latin America or Africa find it difficult to persuade Congress to approve U.S. aid, Israel can lobby for their cause.
There are a number of Third World leaders who believe that Israel is terribly influential in the U.S.
and feel that if they can work with Israel, they'll get a better deal.
Yes, that myth exists.
We have done nothing to encourage it, but I do agree with you that there is such a myth and that it does exist,
and people come to us sometimes and say, look, please, we want to improve our relations with the United States.
Please help us.
It's a major selling point for Israel in the Third World, and we can use an example.
General Mobutu of Zaire, who suffers from a considerable public relations problem in the U.S. or an image problem.
Basically, when you mention Mr. Mobutu, what people think about is a bloody dictator who has $5 billion in Swiss bank accounts while his people are starving.
So this doesn't make him look very good in the U.S. Congress or the U.S. media.
And in this particular case, Israel comes to the rescue.
Mobutu certainly wanted our help, and I think Mobutu was very unjustly.
I think the criticism of Mobutu was very, very strong, let's put it that way.
And he certainly wanted our help to try and soften it a bit. Yes.
When Mobutu is denied foreign aid by the U.S. Congress, and we are talking about something like $80 million, the Israeli lobby starts acting.
And within a few short months, Congress reverses itself and gives Mobutu the money.
Mobutu wasn't the only world leader with faith in Israel's influence.
Did the Shah react the same way?
Oh, yes. The Shah, if there'd be any anti-Iranian article in any newspaper in the United States or even in Europe,
he would call us and say, why did you allow this to happen?
And we would, you know, in vain plead innocence, saying that we don't control the whole of world press as some people think we do.
We don't control the international media. We don't control the banks. These myths aren't exactly the truth.
We had one of the Lebanese leaders, Pierre Jemayel, he once said to me, he said some people think that Israel is a colony of the United States.
It's ridiculous. How can they say that? The United States is a colony of Israel. Why don't they know that?
The two countries weren't always so close. Early on, the state of Israel received no arms and little aid from the U.S.
But Israel's founders had hopes of a much closer relationship with the United States.
Strangely enough, the special, unique relations began in the early 50s, and they were clandestine, completely secret.
At that time, it started with a secret cooperation. An agreement was signed between the CIA and the Mossad.
Israeli historian and journalist Yossi Melman has studied the origins of the covert relationship.
Actually, in 51, David Ben-Gurion went to the United States and surprised the chiefs of the CIA when he suggested that the two security intelligence agencies should cooperate.
The Americans were a bit reluctant about it. They suspected Israel as a socialist country.
Eventually, the Israelis persuaded them that the Americans would benefit from the strategic intelligence cooperation between the two countries.
And by having Israel on their side, the Americans could benefit from good information about the Soviet Union.
We found ourselves in a position that we were able just to penetrate or to solve riddles that others couldn't.
Issa Horel was the most powerful intelligence chief in Israel's history. His access to Jewish communities behind the Iron Curtain yielded intelligence that the CIA considered vital.
You were able to get information from inside the Soviet Bloc that the CIA couldn't get for itself.
Yes. In the early 50s, there were huge massive immigration waves from the Soviet Bloc, from Poland, Romania, Hungary, and later on from the Soviet Union itself.
Many Jews served in high positions in the government, in the communist parties, and they became a source of information about what was going on there.
And for the Americans, it was very important to know what's going on in the Soviet Bloc.
Now this cooperation, this agreement between yourself, your organization, and the CIA, was this generally known in America?
Not at all. But even in this country, we kept it as a great secret.
If the secret, if it had leaked out at the time, would this have had a bad effect for Jewish people in Russia?
Of course. No question about it. And I think at a certain time, we believed that the Russians, in fact the Russians, rather condemned us for it.
The turning point was April 56. The Americans were very anxious to get hold of a speech which was made by Nikita Khrushchev,
which he denounced Stalin and paved the way for a new image of the Soviet Union.
The CIA couldn't get the speech, and the Israeli Mossad, the Israeli intelligence, was able to put its hands on that speech through its agents in the Soviet Bloc.
And the head of the Israeli Mossad, Mr. Israel, himself personally, flew to Washington and gave the speech as a gift of the State of Israel to the United States.
Who in America, in the American government, knew about this cooperation agreement?
The President, the State, the Secretary of State, the top people in the Pentagon, another very small group of important people
who had some connection with the strategy and the defense of the United States.
My name is James Angleton. I'm appearing before the committee today freely and without subpoena.
One of the pivot, the main supporters of the joint cooperation was James Angleton.
At that time he was the head of the counter-espionage department of the CIA.
I have served in the intelligence community of the United States for 31 years, beginning with the OSS during World War II.
Angleton protected the interests of Israel and later on paved the way for a greater cooperation between the two intelligence communities and between the two countries.
He was a great American patriot and was also a friend of Israel as a result of our contribution and our efforts on behalf of the Americans.
In 1956, Angleton's friendship was put to the test.
Israel, along with France and Britain, launched a surprise attack against Egypt.
The Eisenhower administration had not been told because at that time America was officially neutral in the Middle East and refused to arm Israel.
When the American military attache in Tel Aviv warned Washington that he believed Israel was going to war, James Angleton convinced the White House not to listen.
That military attache tipped the CIA and the other branches of the administration.
But Angleton, probably knowing that it's true, tried to distract the mind of the U.S. administration and said that it's not true that the Israelis are planning a major attack against the Egyptians.
Angleton kept control of liaison between the CIA and Israeli intelligence for over 20 years.
After his death in 1987, the Israelis planted a memorial forest outside Jerusalem in honor of their longtime friend at the CIA.
With Angleton's blessing, Israel also served the CIA's interests in Africa.
The CIA was financing most Israeli operations in black Africa in the 1960s.
These operations were quite extensive because at the time Israel had relations with about 30 black African countries and was involved in a lot of things.
And as it turned out, this was all financed by the U.S. government.
Frontline has learned that under a top-secret program codenamed KK Mountain, the CIA funded Israeli covert activities in Africa with a budget of up to $20 million a year.
One product of this relationship was the man who would become the dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin.
He received military training in Israel.
But in spite of the close intelligence cooperation in Africa and elsewhere, Israel had secrets to keep from the United States.
In 1957, Israel enlisted France to help build a nuclear weapons plant at Domona.
According to sources both in the CIA and the French nuclear program, the Israelis in turn agreed to supply France with vital nuclear test data obtained by Israeli agents in the United States.
When the nuclear reactor was discovered mainly by a reconnaissance flight of the U.S. Air Force, Israel said that this nuclear reactor is for peaceful purposes.
In 1961, President Kennedy met with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in New York.
It was a crucial meeting.
Kennedy agreed that the U.S. would sell arms to Israel for the first time.
According to intelligence sources, his decision was due in part to White House fears of an Israeli nuclear arsenal.
It was a deal.
Once the Americans discovered that Israel had a nuclear capability, President Kennedy and later President Johnson persuaded the Israelis that if they seized the nuclear development
and would allow American inspectors to inspect the nuclear facilities, they would get more conventional arms from the United States.
And the United States started supplying Israel with anti-aircraft missiles, skyhawks, phantom fighters, and with tanks.
Although Israel's nuclear weapons program briefly slowed down, it never stopped.
American inspectors were not given full access.
Nevertheless, the flow of arms from the United States steadily increased.
Once the political barrier was lowered through the hot missiles, then things became easier because it irrelevant.
Once you are selling arms anyhow, the U.S. government decided to sell arms to Israel, then it is easier to widen it to airplanes and to tanks and to whatever.
Gradually, they became the main source of supply for the armed forces of Israel.
In June 1967, Israel went to war with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, capturing all of Jerusalem and what are now the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza.
Officially, the U.S. was neutral.
Secretly, it gave Israel full diplomatic support.
The final decision to go to war was not taken, say the Israelis, until their intelligence chief, Mayor Amit, had met secretly with CIA Director Richard Helms.
The first ones to fire were the Israelis, and the Americans were persuaded by the head of the Israeli secret service, the Mossad,
who met with the head of the CIA and through this secret channel got the green light of the administration to start the war.
In 1973, it was Israel's turn to be attacked.
The U.S. poured in over $2.5 billion worth of emergency military aid during and after the war.
U.S. military spending for Israel soared at the same time as Arab nations began spending billions for American hardware.
The war was a turning point because Israel now came to expect major gifts of American arms and money as routine.
In the next 15 years, Israel would receive over $27 billion in U.S. military aid.
Today, that aid guarantees Israel an important ally in Washington, the defense lobby.
When American contractors and lobbyists turned up in Tel Aviv last fall, the defense ministry was anxious to show them what Israel has to offer.
Weapons are now Israel's biggest export, and one out of every four Israelis makes a living from the industry.
But to survive, the Israeli defense business has to have American support, not only cash aid, but also technology handed over by the U.S.
Thanks to the strategic relationship, Israel gets much of the American know-how it needs to develop products for sale abroad.
The question of what technology should be released to Israel is one of the most sensitive issues in the Pentagon.
The tent is crossing the bridge and ready for the next measure.
Not all the technology is open to us. The U.S. technology is open to us.
When technology is open to us, when we are reaching the standards of our own technology,
and when the U.S. government sees that we are already, and anyhow we master that technology, then they are releasing it.
So in a sense, they are forcing us to do R&D in certain areas which are not open to us in order to get to them.
But if Israel desperately needed some technology and was being denied by the U.S. government, what do you do?
We develop our own.
Everything you have just seen has been made under one roof in a small country with big defense problems.
If it is given or bought from the United States, there is no need to get it by other means.
But there are certain technologies when it comes to the nuclear technology,
when it comes to some other very, very sophisticated advanced technologies regarding avionics of the Air Force,
then it's difficult even for a good ally of the United States such as Israel to get it from the United States.
And then in that case Israel is trying to get it either from other sources or even to steal it, if you wish.
Stolen technology from U.S. companies has turned up in Israel more than once.
U.S. Customs tracked one case of theft to an American company called Napco.
Sir, I have here with me a U.S. Federal search warrant. We will search all the buildings. This is what we are looking for.
Napco had obtained a top-secret process for chrome-plating tank barrels from the U.S. Army.
The plans turned up in Israel. In 1987, Napco pleaded guilty to illegal export.
Not only did Israel steal the Army's edge on improving U.S. tanks,
but they built a top-secret plant in Israel to duplicate the process.
Israeli military industries, also known as TAS, financed the plant with $1.9 million of U.S. aid money.
Questions about theft have been raised about technology ranging from cluster bombs to nuclear triggering devices.
But the most shocking of all was the case of Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. intelligence analyst recruited to spy for Israel.
He delivered more than 800,000 highly classified documents from U.S. Naval Intelligence to his Israeli controller.
Many of the documents he was asked to steal detailed ultra-sensitive technology that the U.S. had no intention of sharing.
If the United States government and people were offended that we had to resort to spying on the United States,
that was bad. I mean, we didn't like it.
Sfi Rafia is a key lobbyist for Israeli defense interests in Washington.
It's not just being caught. It's the fact that among very good friends, close allies, etc., one had to resort to such a means to get something.
Although, on the other hand, one can say, and I don't mean to justify what took place,
but I can only say that if one had to resort to such a case, maybe one didn't get what he thought he should get from an ally and a friend.
The Americans felt almost like you invite a guest to your house and then he's putting his hands on the family jewelry.
Well, how was that allowed to happen?
First of all, it wasn't done by the Mossad, which has a secret cooperation agreement with the CIA.
And they felt that they either were against it, against spying on a major ally of Israel, or perhaps they felt that they couldn't do it.
And therefore, the job was given to another branch of the Israeli intelligence, a secret branch which wasn't even known to the United States until that time.
That was the Scientific Liaison Bureau.
The Scientific Liaison Bureau, or LECAM, was not named in this classified 1979 CIA report on Israeli intelligence, captured at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.
But the CIA did know that Israel's top priorities included, quote, collection of information on secret U.S. policy or decision, if any, concerning Israel, collection of scientific intelligence in the U.S., end quote.
This mission, it seems, was the responsibility of the secret intelligence branch.
It was an agency, on top of many other agencies, which had a greater liberty of operation, could probably operate with less restrictions than others.
Although the others are not terribly restricted, but this agency was probably even less restricted than others.
And therefore, they could go all the way to try and spy on the American Navy.
They were there in that business to get technology for Israel for almost any cost.
And they were ready to pay almost any price for getting the technology they wanted, which they perceived as vital for the security of Israel.
Whether the United States government wanted them to have it or not.
Yes. Yes, by all means.
Despite cases of theft and espionage, Israelis hope that such incidents will not upset the relationship they depend on.
Nothing can be more frightening to the Israeli public than the threat that the United States might not support Israel on a certain issue or a certain problem, or might cut the financial defense.
I mean, these matters really frighten the Israelis very much.
But having said that, of course, apart from that, the United States is such a huge country with so many opportunities for little Israel to benefit from.
So if Israel breaks the rule from time to time on small matters, it's not considered really an unforgivable crime.
Israel shares much of its defense technology with a country officially embargoed by the U.S., South Africa.
Refueling tankers like this one, sold by Israel, allow South Africa to pursue its enemies far beyond its borders.
Since 1977, when the U.N. embargoed arms sales to South Africa, Israel has sold everything from missiles and jet fighters to howitzers and guns.
They have shipped communications equipment, radar systems, and intelligence technology.
There is a very high level of collaboration in terms of military training, weapons production, weapon development.
The United States, I think, isn't even aware of everything that is going on between Israel and South Africa.
Total destruction of the target is assured by a specially developed warhead.
Israel's Barak naval missile is reportedly one current co-production with South Africa.
The issue of whether Israel has transferred U.S. technology as well as its own was raised in a 1987 State Department report on South Africa.
It advised the president to, quote, adopt measures to prevent countries such as Israel that import U.S. arms and defense material from transshipping such goods to South Africa,
end quote.
Nevertheless, Israel has announced that it will fulfill all existing contracts.
The length of these contracts is classified secret.
The policy of the State of Israel for the past few years has been to go along with other democratic countries regarding the policy towards South Africa.
We have acted, I would say, accordingly in accordance with what the other democratic countries have been doing regarding South Africa.
Which leads me to ask a question about the United States and its relationship with South Africa.
Look, that I can't answer.
I mean, you're saying that countries like the United States or Britain or France at this point are happy with a close relationship with South Africa.
I didn't say that.
I didn't say that at all.
I said that at one time or other they were sending arms.
At one time or other.
I'm not saying they're doing it today.
I'm not saying that we're doing it today.
I'm saying that at one time or another that had been a situation.
And then it was cut out.
Though there's still arm shipments now going on.
Where from?
From Israel.
I don't know.
Israeli defense officials insist that all arms sales involving U.S. technology are coordinated with the U.S.
General Modi had.
If you want to sell to Chile, if you want to sell to South Africa.
Because it is not, because it is in no alternative situation, we know that we have to coordinate it with the U.S. authorities.
And we know that if we want to continue to enjoy the $1.8 billion a year military aid.
And the outcome of it is military products.
And we want to sell them outside of Israel.
We have to coordinate it with the U.S. government.
It's not a question of liking or not liking.
Those are facts.
Are there any limits on terms of customers that Israel will or will not sell arms to?
I don't think so.
It is well known that Israel sold weapons or spare parts for weapons to Khomeini.
Khomeini was a very welcome customer when he needed some spare parts for his Phantom fighters.
No, I don't think there is any limit or any restriction on who the customer might be.
When war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980, Iran turned to Israel for arms, especially American-made spare parts.
Intelligence sources say the war was useful on two fronts.
It divided the Arab world while Israel earned huge profits.
Israel, in terms of its own strategic thinking, sees Iran as an ally.
Now, the U.S. does not always agree with this thinking completely.
And Israel has had to persuade the U.S. to do all sorts of things.
But Israel has been supplying Iran with arms since 1979.
This has never stopped.
Then there was a story of U.S. involvement.
And this is certainly not a case where Israel has dragged anybody into anything.
This is something that has developed out of internal and external pressures on the U.S. government.
So when Israel was selling arms to Iran all the way through the first regular administration from 1981 to 1984, was this with American permission, with assent?
Certainly.
And we have at least two Israeli defense ministers, Mr. Arendt and Mr. Sharon, on the record, telling the press, telling the media that this is done with the consent of the U.S. government.
And this cannot be doubted.
In 1982, Moshe Arendt said Israel shipped arms to Iran, quote, in coordination with the U.S. at almost the highest of levels, end quote.
That is three years before the shipments admitted by the Reagan administration.
We know from in the early 80s, starting in 1981, 82, Israel was already shipping arms to Iran.
At the time, Moshe Arendt and Eric Sharon came out and stated, yes, we're doing it with the cooperation of almost the highest levels of the U.S. government.
The U.S. government later said, no, no, all that started much later.
I mean, there was a denial of the cooperation.
Would Israel have shipped arms to Iran without the U.S. saying, OK?
I think that Israel, as a matter of policy, wouldn't do anything that will be against the laws or the rules of the United States.
If we are partners, if we are friends and allies, we have to coordinate and work together.
And I think it's in Israel's interest not to do anything to jeopardize the United States' interest.
So as a matter of policy, I think Israel wouldn't do that.
Israel, on the record, had been selling arms to Iran all through the early Reagan administration.
No comment. I don't want to talk about this subject. Sorry.
Sales by Israel to Iran were far greater than those revealed by the Iran Contra investigation.
Official records of these sales remain classified.
As with the Contras and other operations, Israel's covert role was not fully explored.
Does Israel have an alternative to this kind of arrangement of acting as an American surrogate around the world?
Well, at this point, the high level of American support for Israel,
which means that the U.S. essentially sustains the Israeli economy and the Israeli defense establishment,
with this level of support, of course, Israel cannot afford to stop being a major U.S. ally.
So it's really out of the question.
Is this good for Israel?
It's good for Israelis. I would say most Israelis like things as they are.
This is my pledge. The American-Israeli strategic partnership is going to be even stronger tomorrow.
We need that partnership. It is in our self-interest as Americans.
No threat, no stone thrown is strong enough to divide us.
No wedge will be driven between us.
When in 1982, Israeli Defense Minister Ahrens said that Israeli shipments to Iran were approved by the U.S.,
the State Department responded, quote,
Any Israeli decision to supply was purely an Israeli decision, end quote.
As for Central America, the State Department told Frontline that it has no legal authority
over sales of Israeli-made goods without U.S. components,
and when arms sales are part of covert activity, it is their policy not to comment.
Finally, with regard to South Africa,
the State Department says it has no evidence of Israel transferring U.S. defense technology.
Congress passed a new law in 1987 prohibiting such transfers.
However, the law allows existing contracts to be fulfilled.
I'm Judy Woodruff. Good night.
In 1968, in a Vietnamese village called My Lai, American soldiers massacred hundreds of unarmed civilians.
I'd just start killing any kind of way I could kill them.
The legacy of that day still haunts the soldiers and the people of My Lai.
I can't forgive myself. I live with it every day.
Remember My Lai, next time on Frontline.
Frontline is produced for the Documentary Consortium by WGBH Boston, which is solely responsible for its content.
Funding for Frontline is provided by this station and other public television stations nationwide,
and by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
For video cassette information about this program, please write to this address.